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I. Introduction
The charitable deduction has long been a linchpin
of federal tax policy. The deduction for gifts to sec-
tion 501(c)(3) and other organizations is one of the
few federal tax benefits that resonates throughout
society, even among those who do not claim it. In-
deed, it is difficult to think of another tax benefit that
has so completely become part of our national con-
sciousness. Yet the charitable deduction, and the
character of the entire nonprofit sector, is in grave
peril. The peril is not from the familiar changes to the
deduction that have been discussed over the years.1
Rather, the threat comes from probable reforms to
other parts of the income tax system.2
Recent leading tax reform plans propose a sub-
stantial increase to the standard deduction.3 The rea-
son to increase the standard deduction is to reduce
the number of taxpayers who take itemized deduc-
tions, thus simplifying the tax system.4 Because the
charitable deduction is an itemized deduction, far
fewer taxpayers would claim it. For example, under
the House GOP’s ‘‘Better Way’’ tax reform blueprint,
the percentage of taxpayers itemizing deductions
could be reduced from roughly one-third of taxpay-
ers to one-twentieth, or 5 percent.5
What would remain of the charitable deduction
raises serious concerns. This report argues that
broad-based participation in the giving incentive is
central to its integrity and provides a base for a
dynamic and worthy charitable sector. A charitable
1Ideas include putting a cap on the amount of the deduction,
allowing the deduction only for contributions above a set
amount, converting the deduction to a credit, and expanding
the number of taxpayers who may claim the tax benefit.
Congressional Budget Office, ‘‘Options for Changing the Tax
Treatment of Charitable Giving’’ (May 2011). As discussed later
in this report, some of those ideas have merit.
2This report is about the integrity of the charitable deduction
as a tax benefit. It does not discuss the effect on charitable giving
from the proposed repeal of the estate tax. The implications of
estate tax repeal for the nonprofit sector are an important but
separate topic.
3These include the House blueprint, ‘‘A Better Way: Our
Vision for a Confident America’’ (June 24, 2016); the Trump
campaign’s tax plan; and the Tax Reform Act of 2014.
4Under the income tax, taxpayers choose between taking the
standard deduction and itemizing their deductions.
5See, e.g., House blueprint, supra note 3 (stating that ‘‘the Tax
Reform Blueprint aims to reduce the number of taxpayers who
itemize their deductions from about one-third under current
law to approximately 5 percent under our simpler, fairer, and
flatter tax system’’). Not all taxpayers who itemize claim the
charitable deduction. For example, in 2014 approximately 82
percent of taxpayers who itemized deductions claimed the
charitable deduction. Publication 1304, ‘‘Returns With Itemized
Deductions: Sources of Income, Adjustments, Itemized Deduc-
tions by Type, Exemptions, and Tax Items, by Size of Adjusted
Gross Income, Tax Year 2014,’’ at Table 2.1 (Aug. 2016).
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deduction for only a handful of taxpayers is fatally
flawed and would weaken the law of section
501(c)(3), with dreadful results for the nonprofit sec-
tor. Accordingly, if tax reform moves toward reduc-
ing the number of taxpayers claiming itemized
deductions (and for that matter, even if it does not),6
policymakers should consider converting the chari-
table deduction to a broad-based credit, which
would retain and expand the essential and laudatory
participatory features of the charitable deduction
while also paving the way for other needed reforms.
II. Best Case for Reducing Itemizers
The best case for folding charitable deductions
into the standard deduction lies with the simplifi-
cation benefits. Instead of using a specific charitable
deduction as under current law, for most taxpayers,
charitable contributions would be accounted for
through the standard deduction. Consistent with
current policy, money spent on charitable contribu-
tions, in principle, would not be taxed. In that sense,
the result is just to swap an itemized deduction for
a standard deduction, a major simplification. The
IRS would no longer have to be concerned with
validating millions of charitable contributions, and
millions of taxpayers could give free of substantia-
tion, valuation, or quid pro quo concerns.
Further, despite far fewer itemizers, the amount
of deductible charitable contributions would re-
main high. The 5 percent of taxpayers who would
continue to itemize the charitable deduction,
though small in number, would claim a substantial
percentage of today’s charitable deduction (roughly
55 percent in 2014).7 The simplification gains then
would be real: for 2014, about 28 million fewer
taxpayers claiming the charitable deduction (or
roughly 80 percent of current claimants) and a loss
of far less, proportionately, of the total amount of
deductions claimed (only about 45 percent).8
Still, a shift of 45 percent of charitable contribu-
tions from the charitable deduction to a standard
deduction could result in reduced charitable giving.
Without a direct incentive to give,9 taxpayers might
claim just the standard deduction because they are
entitled to it, but not make charitable contributions
they otherwise would have made. In other words,
with the standard deduction automatic, the cost of
giving would increase for taxpayers, and they
might decide not to give.
The extent to which giving levels would change
depends on the role the tax incentive plays in
facilitating the decision whether and how much to
give. A preliminary estimate of one proposal to
increase the standard deduction (the Tax Reform
Act of 2014) suggests a decrease in charitable giving
by individuals in the range of 0.9 to 1.8 percent.10
This modest estimated decrease in giving might
reflect that individuals make charitable contribu-
tions for reasons apart from tax policy. For example,
many give out of charitable impulse and the per-
sonal desire to help others, and would give regu-
larly without a tax incentive, as non-itemizers do
today.11
On the other hand, it is difficult to predict how
donors would respond to a significantly changed
legal landscape. Some have argued, for example,
that non-itemizers give partly because they believe
they are getting a charitable deduction (because of
the nontransparency of the deduction).12 If the
deduction is changed so that very few taxpayers
actually claim it, non-itemizers might soon under-
stand that they receive no benefit and respond by
not giving. Also, as discussed below, with 95 per-
cent of taxpayers not claiming the charitable deduc-
tion, the meaning of charitable giving would
change. Thus, even if giving levels did not decrease
substantially, the recipients of giving would change,
to the detriment of 501(c)(3) organizations.
In short, seen in its best light, shifting claimants
out of itemization offers simplification and the same
6This report is written in the context of tax reform proposals
to increase the standard deduction. The arguments, however,
resonate with tax reform of the charitable deduction generally
and so are not limited to that context.
7For tax year 2014, according to IRS data, the top 5.35 million
returns measured by adjusted gross income (or 3.6 percent of
total returns) account for almost 51 percent of the total chari-
table deduction. It is not possible based on IRS data to allocate
the charitable deduction precisely to the remaining 1.4 percent
of top returns because the returns are grouped by income, so an
approximate amount was derived. All calculations are based on
Publication 1304, supra note 5, at tables 1.2 and 2.1.
8Id. Technically, the IRS reports based on tax returns, not
taxpayers.
9Some taxpayers would continue to have a direct incentive
because some states provide a tax incentive for charitable gifts.
10Joseph Rosenberg et al., ‘‘Preliminary Estimates of the
Impact of the Camp Tax Reform Plan on Charitable Giving,’’
Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center (Aug. 2014). The range is
explained in part because of the ‘‘uncertainty in the responsive-
ness of individuals to the tax incentive provided by the chari-
table deduction.’’ This decrease includes effects of other changes
made by former House Ways and Means Committee Chair Dave
Camp’s plan to other non-itemized-deduction provisions. For
the Camp plan as a whole (including changes to the rate
structure and other changes), the report estimates a 7 to 14
percent decrease in individual giving.
11According to Giving USA, in 2015 approximately 18 per-
cent of total giving was by non-itemizers. Giving USA, ‘‘The
Annual Report on Philanthropy for the Year 2015,’’ at 22 (2016).
12Lillian V. Faulhaber, ‘‘The Hidden Limits of the Charitable
Deduction: An Introduction to Hypersalience,’’ 92 B.U. L. Rev.
1307 (2012).
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or similar positive tax outcome for most taxpayers,
but with an uncertain effect on giving.
III. A Nonparticipatory Charitable Deduction?
Undoubtedly, simplification of the tax system
and the effect on giving levels are key consider-
ations for assessing a shift to a standard deduction
as the way to account for charitable contributions.
But more important for this report is the effect
reducing the number of itemizers would have on
the charitable deduction that remains. Although the
law of the deduction would be the same as before,13
the ground would have shifted entirely.
Once most itemizers migrated to the standard
deduction, the remaining charitable deduction
would become an incentive for a small group of
itemizers, generally the wealthiest taxpayers. The
question becomes the extent to which there is
support for that limited incentive.
There have been many explanations for the chari-
table deduction over the century of its existence.
Some of the key rationales are that it promotes al-
truistic behavior, fosters the private charitable
choices of taxpayers, and advances a pluralistic so-
ciety.14 All have an element of truth, but as discussed
below, for coherence all depend on the deduction
being widely participatory. In other words, under
these explanations for the charitable deduction, a
deduction for a small percentage of taxpayers
(wealthy or otherwise) is fundamentally flawed.
First, the rationale that the charitable deduction
encourages giving or altruistic behavior generally
— that is, giving for giving’s sake — provides
perhaps its strongest support. The theory is
straightforward. As a society we all benefit from
being part of a culture of giving. When we are
encouraged to, and do, give to others, it is more
likely that others will give. Giving becomes a norm
and part of the social fabric. By reducing the cost of
giving, the charitable deduction in this sense is a
policy tool to promote altruism.
A charitable deduction that rewards the altruism
of just a small fraction of society, however, would
undermine the goal of promoting altruism more
broadly. Is the only altruism worth rewarding that
of a small slice of the population, which also
happens to be the wealthiest? As a social value, the
promotion of altruism should extend well beyond
this group of taxpayers, and especially to those for
whom giving is more of a sacrifice and so more
meaningful as a social value. Accordingly, a chari-
table deduction for the few is not supported by an
altruism rationale.
The charitable deduction also has been explained
as a way to allow private individuals directly to
allocate taxpayer (subsidy) dollars.15 That is, by
making a contribution, donors have the power to
direct public money (through a government match)
as a private appropriation. Under the private choice
rationale, it can be said that the charitable deduc-
tion facilitates taxpayer participation in setting phil-
anthropic priorities and that it is good civics.
A charitable incentive that is claimed by just 5
percent of taxpayers, however, essentially rejects
the private choice rationale as well. Like the altru-
ism rationale, the private choice rationale is credible
only to the extent that the deduction is usable by a
large swath of taxpayers. Under the charitable
deduction that remains once the standard deduc-
tion is increased, the power to direct a private
allocation of public funds would continue, but only
for a few. Why should only one narrow group of
taxpayers be allowed to direct public monies in this
fashion? And why is it good civics to extend private
choice just to this particular group? Ultimately then,
the private choice rationale also fails to support a
charitable deduction with few participants.
Another related rationale for the charitable de-
duction is that it fosters pluralism. The pluralism
rationale is tied to the generous eligibility criteria for
tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3). Section
501(c)(3) status is granted based on an organization’s
purposes, which are broadly defined as charitable,
educational, religious, scientific, or literary.16 Thus,
section 501(c)(3), through the determination for in-
come tax exemption, sets the standard for most or-
ganizations that are eligible to receive deductible
13Congress could tinker with the remaining deduction, as in
TRA 2014 (imposing a floor based on AGI, reducing the amount
of the deduction for specific property contributions, changing
the percentage limitations, and extending the time to claim the
deduction until April 15, among other provisions).
14There are others. Perhaps the most common is that the
deduction supports charity in the narrow sense of helping the
needy. This is true, but only partially because the charitable
deduction supports a wide range of organizational purposes. If
the charitable deduction was intended only to promote charity
in a traditional sense, the deduction would have to be narrowed
significantly (which would be another reform option). Another
view is that the charitable deduction is best understood as a way
to measure (and define) income, that is, a person should not be
taxed on money spent for charitable purposes. Under this view,
an increase to the standard deduction to account for charitable
contributions is no more than a base-defining measure. Consis-
tent with this view, to raise the standard deduction by an
amount sufficient to exclude the charitable contributions of the
very affluent would be absurd, thus the need to retain a
charitable deduction for this group.
15See generally Roger Colinvaux, Brian Galle, and C. Eugene
Steuerle, ‘‘Evaluating the Charitable Deduction and Proposed
Reforms,’’ Urban Institute (June 2012).
16Section 501(c)(3). Public safety organizations also are de-
scribed in section 501(c)(3) but are ineligible for deductible
charitable contributions.
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contributions.17 Because a wide variety of organiza-
tions can obtain section 501(c)(3) status, and donors
may then donate to (or even form) their favorite
charity, a diverse and pluralistic sector emerges —
reflecting the varying preferences of donors with
differing backgrounds and concerns. Here then the
link between section 501(c)(3) and a participatory
charitable deduction is especially important.
The pluralism rationale, although appealing, is
limited even as applied to the current charitable
deduction. By definition, as an itemized deduction,
the deduction serves the preferences of itemizers,
which under current law generally are the top 30
percent of taxpayers as measured by income.18
Thus, if itemizers favor giving to their alma mater
over providing for basic needs, universities are
better served by the deduction than basic needs
charities. In other words, the pluralism offered by
the charitable deduction already narrowly reflects
the pool of itemizers.19
By greatly reducing the pool, a charitable deduc-
tion for the few would make a mockery of the
pluralism rationale. Although the eligibility criteria
to become a charitable organization would remain
broad, and therefore nominally pluralistic, the effect
would be to favor with a tax incentive the charitable
choices of a small percentage of taxpayers, in this
case the wealthiest, which would not foster societal
pluralism. Rather, it could reasonably be expected
that the pluralism of the sector would shrink and
that the sector would cater to the preferences of this
group of taxpayers.
In sum, a charitable deduction that is claimed
only by a wealthy few is anathema to how the
charitable deduction is often justified. Even if it
made sense to provide an incentive to just that
group of taxpayers, an incentive that fostered only
the giving choices of the group would be, or should
be, untenable. The choices of one small group of
taxpayers should not be favored over those of any
other. This group does not inherently make better
charitable choices than other taxpayers do, nor is its
altruism more worthy of recognition than others’.
Thus, the ironic vision represented by a charitable
deduction claimed by the few is to squeeze section
501(c)(3) further to reflect the giving preferences of
the most affluent in society — a result very much at
odds with historical perceptions of and rationales
for the charitable deduction.
IV. Effects on Behavior and the Charitable Sector
There are other reasons to question the wisdom
of a charitable deduction for the few. To move from
a country where a critical mass of taxpayers have an
incentive to use section 501(c)(3) to define their
giving choices to a country where section 501(c)(3)
matters legally for only 5 percent of taxpayers
would be a seismic shift.
As noted above, charitable giving by the ‘‘95
percent’’ would hardly come to an end. But the
signaling power of the law over time would become
largely irrelevant for most taxpayers in determining
their giving choices. The result would be to alter
fundamentally the market for charitable gifts and
charitable organizations and further dilute the
meaning of charity. Moreover, as section 501(c)(3)
receded in importance as the defining standard for
charitable giving, the validity of using section
501(c)(3) as a base for a wide-ranging system of tax
benefits would be weakened. In a nutshell, the
questions, discussed next, are how giving, and thus
the sector, would be affected by eliminating section
501(c)(3) status for organizations as a condition of
giving for so many and by retaining section
501(c)(3) status as an incentive for so few.
A. A Changed Market for Charity
For a century, we have taken for granted that
charitable giving (and charitable activity) occurs
through the section 501(c)(3) organization. The ques-
tion is whether that would continue once section
501(c)(3) status is no longer necessary as a condition
for charitable gifts for most people. Or put more
starkly, once 95 percent of the taxpaying population
could ignore the tax code entirely when making
charitable gifts, would the section 501(c)(3) organi-
zation, and all that it stands for, remain relevant?
Section 501(c)(3) (combined with the common
law) sets the standard for a public benefit organi-
zation. To qualify the organization must have a
charitable or other noble purpose and serve a
charitable class. Profits may not benefit organiza-
tion insiders, nor may there be too much private
benefit. Political and substantial lobbying activities
are prohibited. The nature of the organization’s
activities must not be overly commercial, charitable
activity must predominate over unrelated activities,
and assets must be dedicated to charity upon dis-
solution of the organization. Combined, these car-
dinal rules of section 501(c)(3) status have shaped
the charitable sector.
The immediate effect of a marginalized section
501(c)(3) might be slight. Out of both habit and
17Technically, a deductible charitable contribution must be to
an organization described in section 170(c). Section 170 largely
copies the language of section 501(c)(3). Thus, essentially, sec-
tion 501(c)(3) exemption standards are the gatekeeper for deter-
mining the meaning of charitable for purposes of the charitable
deduction.
18The percentage of taxpayers who itemize varies from year
to year. In 2014, 29.6 percent of returns itemized. Publication
1304, supra note 5, at Table 1.2.
19This is also generally a fair critique of the other rationales.
As an itemized deduction, the charitable deduction directly
rewards only the altruism and choices of itemizers.
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history, section 501(c)(3) would continue to be a
relevant guide for giving by non-itemizers, even
though donors could disregard it. Because section
501(c)(3) status has for so long been a required part
of charitable giving, and so many organizations
have adopted it, donor patterns of giving to long-
established and familiar section 501(c)(3) organiza-
tions would probably not rapidly change.
But over time the law of section 501(c)(3) and its
role in shaping the charitable sector (and so civil
society) would be weakened in critical ways. From
a donor perspective, without section 501(c)(3) as a
necessary magnet, some giving would change di-
rection, regardless of whether it is reduced. Many
donors would divert their dollars to individuals;
political organizations; non-charitable nonprofits,
such as section 501(c)(4) groups; ‘‘social enterprise’’
groups; and even purely for-profit groups with a
social mission — all of which cater more to a private
benefit than do traditional charities.20
Eventually, as donors understood that section
501(c)(3) status was not necessary to their giving
choices, the border between charitable and non-
charitable organizations would erode. For non-
itemizers, personal preference and not the section
501(c)(3) tax classification would determine what
makes a contribution charitable.21 In other words,
for most people, charity would be in the eye of the
beholder, not the law.
Just as donor behavior would weaken the dis-
tinction between traditional charities and other or-
ganizations, donee organizations would face a new
dynamic. From a donee or organizational perspec-
tive, securing or retaining section 501(c)(3) status
would matter less. For organizations that elect
section 501(c)(3) largely because of the charitable
deduction, the essential calculation would be to
weigh the costs and limitations of charitable status
against the chance of attracting contributions from
the 5 percent. Small or neighborhood organizations
that do not rely on contributions from the wealthi-
est taxpayers might opt out of section 501(c)(3)
status in favor of ‘‘social welfare’’ status under
section 501(c)(4).22 Many groups, including
churches, parent teacher associations, and others,
might forgo section 501(c)(3) status to avoid the
political activities prohibition or lobbying limits. In
other words, just as donors could ignore section
501(c)(3), so too could donee organizations.
The marginalization of section 501(c)(3) would
have a profound impact on the types of new groups
that form. New mass funding models (for example,
crowdfunding) that do not rely on contributions
from the wealthiest would make non-section
501(c)(3) status feasible for many organizations.
Common law requirements that organizations serve
a charitable class would not matter.23 It would be
natural to expect more advocacy organizations to
compete for funds. With section 501(c)(3) as the
basis for determining charity undermined, it would
be harder for consumers to distinguish self-serving
from public-serving organizations.
In short, setting aside section 501(c)(3) status as a
condition for deductible charitable giving would
give rise to various changes in giving behavior and
organizational norms and undermine the border be-
tween charitable and non-charitable organizations.
The charity we are accustomed to (albeit already
imperfect) would be diluted considerably. Although,
as noted, giving might not decrease by huge mar-
gins, non-itemizing donors (the 95 percent) would
be free to define charity according to personal pref-
erence, thereby changing the market for donee or-
ganizations and constraining the power of section
501(c)(3) to set a standard for public benefit.
B. Systemic Weakness
Yet another concern arises from a charitable de-
duction for the few: the credibility of the federal-
state system of charitable tax benefits and
preferences. At the federal level, section 501(c)(3)
status has long been synonymous with the charitable
deduction, but other tax benefits also flow from sec-
tion 501(c)(3) status, such as federal income tax ex-
emption,24 access to tax-exempt financing,25 exempt
20See generally Dana Brakman Reiser, ‘‘Theorizing Forms for
Social Enterprise,’’ 62 Emory L. J. 681 (2013). Indeed, this is
already happening to a considerable extent. The initiative by
Mark Zuckerberg and Priscilla Chan to fund their philanthropy
not using a section 501(c)(3) organization is one example. The
GoFundMe social fundraising website is another. In general,
project organizers would be able to market themselves to
non-itemizers without having to adopt the constraints of section
501(c)(3).
21Congress would have to decide whether to modify the gift
tax.
22Section 501(c)(4) organizations, unlike section 501(c)(3)
organizations, may engage in political activity and unlimited
lobbying.
23Parochial disaster relief organizations and local groups that
arise to help a family through a tragedy would attract money
that might otherwise have been shaped by traditional charitable
forms. For recent discussions of the issue, see Ellen P. Aprill,
‘‘Charitable Class, Disaster Relief, and First Responders,’’ Tax
Notes, Nov. 14, 2016, p. 949.
24Federal income tax exemption, unlike the other benefits, is
hardly unique to section 501(c)(3) and is provided, in various
forms, to at least 28 other organization types. Indeed, as
discussed above, the availability of income tax exemption
outside section 501(c)(3) would tempt some organizations (ex-
isting or forming) to consider non-section 501(c)(3) status.
25Section 145.
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postal rates, and exemption from various federal
regulatory rules.26 Section 501(c)(3) status also in-
fluences state law benefits, including state income
and property tax exemptions. Thus, section 501(c)(3)
serves as the legal foundation (even symbol) for an
entire federal-state system of preferential treat-
ment.27
Once section 501(c)(3) is set aside for most tax-
payers for charitable deduction purposes, it would
be an open question whether section 501(c)(3)
should continue its elevated status for other tax and
legal purposes. A principal reason for the impor-
tance of section 501(c)(3) as a standard stems from
the fact that it is linked to the charitable deduc-
tion.28 Although the link between a marginalized
section 501(c)(3) and the charitable deduction
would remain as a formal matter,29 the weak ratio-
nale for a charitable deduction that serves the
preferences of a small minority of (wealthy) taxpay-
ers would cast a shadow on the section 501(c)(3)
sector generally. In other words, the fact that the
charitable deduction, and by extension section
501(c)(3), would become a vehicle for serving the
choices of the wealthiest taxpayers would call into
question the suitability of using section 501(c)(3)
status, with all it entails, as a basis for other benefits.
The importance of a widely used charitable con-
tribution deduction to the quality of section
501(c)(3) as a basis for deriving other tax benefits
has never been tested. Arguably, however, the reli-
ance of many people from a relatively broad spec-
trum of society on section 501(c)(3) status over time
to define giving choices bestows legitimacy on the
section 501(c)(3) label, as informed by federal law.
The fact that a significant slice of the population at
some point in their lives may claim the charitable
deduction makes the section 501(c)(3) organization
truly public, reflecting public preferences. The sec-
tion 501(c)(3) label shapes the entire sector, even for
non-itemizers who give and rely on the representa-
tions inherent in section 501(c)(3) status as a way to
segregate or define their charitable activity.
Remove the participatory nature of the charitable
deduction and it becomes unclear what type of
charitable sector is left behind and who is served.
The system of federal-state benefits, already under
stress, would be further undermined.
It is easy to take for granted the extent to which
section 501(c)(3) and the charitable deduction are
part of an organic whole. Together, the two are like
a coin with two sides. The coin is the public benefit
organization, and the sides of the coin are section
501(c)(3) status (and all it entails) and a charitable
deduction, as historically understood. If one side
becomes weak, the entire coin is tarnished.
V. A More Participatory Charitable Tax Benefit
If a starting point for tax reform is to increase the
standard deduction and substantially reduce the
number of itemizers,30 what should be done with
the charitable deduction? As discussed, the idea of
a charitable deduction for the wealthiest in society
is problematic. Three broad alternatives are worth
considering: Expand the tax benefit, eliminate it, or
keep the deduction, but make substantial changes
to address in part that it would be claimed mostly
by a small handful of wealthy taxpayers. As dis-
cussed below, the best option is to expand, and
reform, the charitable giving incentive.
A. Expand the Tax Benefit to More Taxpayers
One of the long-standing critiques of the chari-
table deduction is that as an itemized deduction, it
already is tilted toward the wealthiest. Thus, most
taxpayers, and so society, are denied the participa-
tory benefits.
Rather than narrowing the deduction and making
it even more prone to an elitism-based critique, poli-
cymakers should expand the giving incentive by
making it available to more taxpayers. If all taxpay-
ers were allowed a tax benefit for charitable gifts, the
26Bazil Faccina, Evan Showell, and Jan E. Stone, ‘‘Privileges
& Exemptions Enjoyed by Nonprofit Organizations,’’ 28 U.S.F.
L. Rev. 85 (1993).
27Thus, when the IRS makes a determination that an orga-
nization qualifies as a section 501(c)(3), it is doing much more
than rendering judgment on qualification for federal income tax
exemption. The IRS in effect is certifying that the organization is
worthy of the many benefits that flow from the status, including
the charitable deduction.
28For all but four years of the income tax, the charitable
deduction and section 501(c)(3) status have been connected.
Although descriptively, the section 501(c)(3) organization’s
charitable purposes are what distinguish it from other tax-
exempt organizations, as a practical matter, it is the fact that
these purposes make the section 501(c)(3) organization eligible
to receive charitable contributions (just like the government)
that sets section 501(c)(3) organizations apart from other non-
profits. Some private non-section 501(c)(3) organizations are
eligible to receive deductible contributions, namely veterans’
organizations, cemetery companies, and fraternal benefit orga-
nizations (only specific contributions). These are outliers and are
not generally eligible for multiple other benefits that flow from
section 501(c)(3) status.
29The tax benefits based on section 501(c)(3) status are
severable and, absent a change in law, would continue. For
instance, access to tax-exempt financing does not depend on the
charitable deduction. State law benefits typically use section
501(c)(3) status as a base, not the charitable deduction. In other
words, as a matter of positive law, section 501(c)(3) and the law
of exemption are the hub for the federal-state system of chari-
table tax benefits.
30As noted, even if an increased standard deduction is not
part of tax reform, the question whether to change the charitable
deduction must be addressed and the arguments below remain
valid.
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pluralism, choice, and altruism rationales for a giv-
ing incentive would each be served and strength-
ened to the benefit of the charitable sector and
society.
A truly participatory charitable giving incentive
could be accomplished in one of two ways. One
would be to extend the charitable deduction to all
taxpayers (that is, an above-the-line deduction
taken in addition to the standard deduction).31 The
other would be to convert the deduction to a credit.
In the context of fundamental tax reform, when
major changes to the status quo are feasible, a credit
is preferable.
In weighing the choice between a deduction and
a credit, three factors stand out: fairness, flexibility,
and transparency. First, a credit would be fairer
than a deduction. A credit could be set at one rate so
that the amount of the tax benefit for each taxpayer
claiming the credit would be the same. For example,
if the credit rate were 25 percent, for every $100 gift,
the credit would be $25. By contrast, if a deduction
is used, the tax benefit varies depending on a
taxpayer’s income: the higher a taxpayer’s income,
the higher the tax rate and the greater the value of
the deduction. For example, for a $100 gift, a
taxpayer in a 25 percent bracket would get a tax
benefit of $25, whereas a taxpayer in a 30 percent
bracket would get a tax benefit of $30.32 The dispar-
ity in tax benefit increases with wealth: If the tax
rate is 35 percent, the benefit is $35, and so on.
Tax reform, and converting to a credit, provides
an opportunity to remedy that long-standing imbal-
ance. There is no reason to reward the giving of the
wealthy more than that of taxpayers who earn less.
Altruism should be rewarded equally. The long-
standing disparate treatment among taxpayers is
simply a consequence of using a deduction for the
tax benefit, which was the natural choice in 1917,
when the charitable deduction was introduced. One
hundred years later, the inequity need not continue.
Second, a credit offers more flexibility than a
deduction to respond to changes in society and the
charitable sector. With a credit, it would be easier to
tailor the giving incentive more toward policy
goals. A credit would allow for (but not mandate)
multiple credit rates depending on the type of
charity. For example, gifts to private foundations
could receive a credit but at a lower rate than gifts
to other charities.33 Gifts of noncash contributions
could be disfavored relative to cash to account for
valuation and other problems commonly associated
with contributions of property.34 In a time of crisis,
the credit mechanism could be used to drive de-
ductible dollars to meet critical needs. Setting pri-
orities of this type (which would and should be
debated) is more difficult with deductions, which
are intended primarily to measure income and
which tie the value of the tax benefit to the rate
structure and not to any particular charitable end.
Relatedly, a credit would establish the indepen-
dence of the charitable giving incentive and giving
policy. Changes to the broader income tax rate
structure would not then have the indirect effect of
changing the cost of giving. Congress would set the
credit rate independently, but remain free to in-
crease or decrease the rate based on evidence of
taxpayer responsiveness and cost. If Congress
wanted to provide for a higher credit rate based on
taxpayer income (as occurs with the current deduc-
tion), there would be no bar. But at least then the
differential in tax benefit would be transparent. In
short, a credit would enable policymakers to be
smarter about charitable giving policy.
Finally, a credit might well lead to more chari-
table giving than a deduction. As a general matter,
a credit is much more transparent than a deduction
precisely because the value of the credit is fixed.
Simply as a matter of marketing, for many taxpay-
ers, knowing the amount of the discount on a
charitable gift — for example, ‘‘for every $100 you
give, you get $25 back’’ — may be more effective
than ‘‘your gift is tax deductible.’’ This could be true
even when, depending on the credit rate, the de-
duction actually would generate a larger benefit.
The fact that come tax time a taxpayer is in the 30
percent bracket and so receives a tax benefit of $30
might not create as much of an incentive to give as
being told ahead of time that the benefit is $25. In
other words, seeing the dollar sign at the time of
giving likely makes the tax benefit more tangible,
and giving more attractive, than an abstract refer-
ence to a deduction whose value cannot be deter-
mined until long after the gift is made.
31Calls for an above-the-line charitable deduction are not
new. For recent discussion, see Rosenberg et al., ‘‘The New
Debate Over a Charitable Deduction for Nonitemizers,’’ Urban
Institute (Oct. 2016).
32This effect is sometimes called the ‘‘upside-down’’ subsidy
effect. The tax rates used are hypothetical.
33In general, providing for different tax benefits is possible
with a deduction, but it is awkward. See section 170(l) (limiting
the deduction to 80 percent of the amount given when the right
to purchase tickets at a major sporting event is received in
return). Yet even this rule is framed as an effort to capture the
actual amount of the gift, and so appropriately measure income,
by simply providing by rule a proxy for the value of the benefit
received.
34See Colinvaux, ‘‘Charitable Contributions of Property: A
Broken System Reimagined,’’ 50 Harv. J. on Legis. 263 (2013).
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All that said, it is beyond the scope of this report
to discuss all the features of an expanded charitable
tax benefit. One important issue that would arise,
whether any expansion is by a credit or a non-
itemizer deduction, is whether to pair the benefit
with a floor, that is, a contribution amount below
which no tax benefit is allowed.35 In general, a floor
would preserve the incentive effect for contribu-
tions above the floor amount, help prevent fraud,
and reduce the administrative and revenue costs
associated with extending the incentive to all tax-
payers.36 Also, any expansion should retain many
of the central features of the charitable deduction,
for example, a cap on the credit equal to a percent-
age of a taxpayer’s income, a ban on gifts of partial
interests, and the requirement that gifts be to a
qualified organization. These and other details are
important and would have to be determined by
policymakers.
B. Eliminate the Charitable Giving Incentive?
Tax reform presents an opportunity to rethink
long-standing initiatives and often is a once-in-a-
generation chance to make historic changes to tax
policy. As the arguments above indicate, there are
good reasons to expand the giving incentive that
are consistent with its rationale. But there are also
reasons to hesitate and at least to consider whether
to continue with a charitable giving incentive at all.
One argument for eliminating the incentive
might be that it is not necessary. As a threshold
matter, the degree to which the charitable deduction
affects behavior is not known. People give to char-
ity for a host of reasons, tax savings being but one.
If the charitable giving incentive were eliminated,
giving would decrease but would not stop. More-
over, charitable giving is but one source of support
for the charitable sector. Other key sources of sup-
port are direct government spending and fees
charged by nonprofits for services (for example,
tuition and healthcare payments).37 Accordingly,
although eliminating a charitable giving incentive
would harm the charitable sector — some organi-
zations more than others — it would not mean the
end of funding.
Even so, assessing the charitable giving incentive
in purely economic terms does not do it justice. At
bottom, the incentive is about more than affecting
giving levels; it is also about culture and the pro-
motion of a pluralistic civil society. Further, for the
parts of the charitable sector that rely most heavily
on charitable contributions and do not charge for
services (for example, human services organiza-
tions), a giving incentive helps legitimize their ac-
tivities as inherently public and provides a bulwark
of support in times when government may reduce its
spending. Also, as noted earlier, but even more ex-
treme in the context of elimination, the intangible
effects of not having a giving incentive would be to
divorce giving behavior from any legal standard,
rendering section 501(c)(3) status irrelevant.
Another argument for eliminating the incentive
might be to recognize that despite its aspirational
purposes, the charitable deduction entails costs.
One of its main effects is to require federal oversight
of the charitable sector. Because significant federal
tax dollars are involved, the federal government has
a stake in making sure that donated funds are used
as intended. Accordingly, there are many federal
rules and legal doctrines directed to the organiza-
tion and operation of section 501(c)(3) organizations
that do not apply to other nonprofits.38 Moreover,
because of the importance of the section 501(c)(3)
classification, organizations seeking the status must
apply to the IRS for a determination, involving the
tax agency in the affairs of private organizations in
their formative stages.
It is well beyond the scope of this report to
discuss the many issues involved in oversight of
charitable organizations. As a general matter, the
IRS, as a revenue-collecting agency, is not well
equipped to monitor and judge the more than 1
million section 501(c)(3) organizations. Even so, the
necessity for oversight of charities, and the diffi-
culty of the task, does not augur for elimination of
the deduction. However, it does support investing
more resources into oversight and enforcement, a
better understanding by policymakers of the IRS’s
role, and consideration of an alternative to the IRS
35For a discussion of options, including a credit with and
without a floor, see CBO, supra note 1; and Rosenberg, supra note
31.
36For example, in TRA 2014, only charitable contributions
above a set percentage of a taxpayer’s income would get the
benefit. For discussion of the reasons to impose a floor as well as
the possible revenue savings from a floor, see Colinvaux, Galle,
and Steuerle, supra note 15.
37Some organizations rely on charitable giving for support
more than others.
38These include rules against private inurement, private
benefit, commercialism, lobbying, and political activity. The
prohibition on private inurement applies to many non-
charitable nonprofits. Also, a special excise tax on acts of
self-dealing applies to section 501(c)(3) and (4) organizations.
Section 4958. Further, there is a complex classification system
within section 501(c)(3) that arguably would not exist (or would
look much different) were it not for the charitable deduction,
including the distinction between public charities and private
foundations and special rules for donor-advised funds and
supporting organizations.
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as the agency charged with guiding the charitable
sector and enforcing the law.39
A final consideration is that the charitable deduc-
tion itself is remarkably complex and a challenge to
administer. For those unfamiliar with the ins and
outs of the charitable deduction, it consumes
roughly 13,700 words in the IRC and more than
80,000 words of regulations. This complexity under-
mines transparency and can frustrate taxpayers and
the IRS. A significant portion of the complexity, how-
ever, is attributable to charitable contributions of
property, and not to cash contributions, which are
relatively straightforward. Thus, elimination of the
incentive to address complexity and administrative
challenges would be an overbroad response. In-
stead, whether the incentive is in the form of a de-
duction or a credit, it could be reformed to reduce the
problems associated with property contributions.40
The charitable giving incentive should be al-
lowed to continue only after deliberate and in-
formed consideration. Despite imperfections, a
federal tax incentive for charitable giving is long-
standing, has widespread public and political sup-
port, and to a large degree is now a matter of
culture. The charitable deduction is a key part of
civil society. It promotes a culture of giving and of
helping others. The public purposes inherently
served by promoting pluralism and civic participa-
tion can all be tied to federal support for giving
through a tax incentive. Without a giving incentive
and the special status conveyed by section 501(c)(3)
of the tax code, the quality of societal giving and the
integrity of the sector would be undermined.
C. Retain but Curtail the Charitable Deduction
A charitable deduction for the few should be
rejected. However, if Congress chooses to expand
the standard deduction and keep but not expand
the charitable giving incentive, some changes
should be considered to make the deduction for the
few somewhat more tenable. The focus should be
on fairness and ensuring that donated monies are
used for public purposes.
Perhaps most fundamentally, a deduction for
contributions to private foundations should be re-
considered. If only the wealthiest in society deduct
charitable contributions — and at the same time are
allowed to create and control their own foundations
— a federal tax incentive to do so seems inappro-
priate at best. The focus of the remaining incentive
should be on active public charities at arm’s length
from donors.
In addition, it would become even more impor-
tant to require distributions from private founda-
tion substitutes such as donor-advised funds.
Donor-advised funds allow donors a current tax
deduction but delayed distribution pending advice
of the donor, which is not subject to any time limit.
Thus, amounts donated to donor-advised funds
could accumulate indefinitely. Donor-advised
funds should be subject to a mandatory distribution
rule that would ensure that any deductible contri-
bution is paid out to an active charity within a
reasonable time.41
Also, the charitable deduction is already overly
generous by allowing taxpayers to deduct untaxed
appreciation in contributed property. This en-
trenched feature feeds perceptions of the charitable
deduction as benefiting the most privileged in so-
ciety and would be exacerbated by a deduction for
the few. Again, even under current law, there are
reasons to revisit many aspects of the deduction for
property contributions. But with a deduction al-
lowed for only the few, at a minimum Congress
should deny deductions for unrealized apprecia-
tion.42
VI. Conclusion
There is a danger that tax reform could harm the
charitable giving incentive in unintended ways. If
the standard deduction is increased, and as few as 5
percent of taxpayers claim the charitable deduction,
the remaining deduction would gut the aspirational
idea of a giving incentive that encourages an altru-
istic and pluralistic society with broad-based par-
ticipation. Further, the entire charitable sector
would be undermined as the section 501(c)(3) tax
status recedes in importance.
A charitable deduction for the few should be
rejected. Instead, Congress should consider expand-
ing the charitable giving incentive, extending it to
all taxpayers in the form of a credit. A credit would
remove long-standing inequities, allow for smarter
charitable giving policy in the future, and improve
39Evelyn Brody and Marcus Owens, ‘‘Exile to Main Street:
The IRS’s Diminished Role in Overseeing Tax-Exempt Organi-
zations,’’ 91 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 859 (2016).
40Charitable contributions of property should be viewed as a
distinct tax expenditure and considered separately for tax
reform purposes. See Colinvaux, supra note 34.
41There is already a strong case for that type of rule regard-
ing funds sponsored by organizations with commercial affili-
ates. See Colinvaux, ‘‘Donor Advised Funds: Charitable
Spending Vehicles for 21st Century Philanthropy,’’ 92 Wash. L.
Rev. __ (coming 2017). The case becomes stronger when the
charitable deduction becomes the province of the wealthiest.
42Daniel Halperin, ‘‘A Charitable Contribution of Appreci-
ated Property and the Realization of Built-In Gains,’’ 56 Tax L.
Rev. 1 (2002).
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transparency. But if a charitable deduction for the
few becomes part of tax reform, changes should be
made to ensure that deductible contributions are
not abused and go to active public charities.
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